The object of this paper is to throw light on an apparent paradox in the financial history of the British National Health Service (NHS) in, broadly, its first decade. After the first two fiscal years of the Service a regime of tight expenditure restraint was imposed. This reflected a perception of NHS spending as excessive and subject to insufficient control.' In the first volume of his official history of the Service, Charles Webster has referred to the "atmosphere of retrenchment" dominant in the 1950s;2 but the first authoritative investigation of expenditure trends in the NHS, that of the Guillebaud Committee (1956), came to a quite different conclusion. It stated that it could not recommend any means which would "reduce in a substantial degree the annual cost of the Service".3
Tony Cutler
This paper is divided into four parts: the first looks at how the politics of NHS finance has been discussed in the historical literature on the period, and examines the questions which this literature has inadequately addressed; the second considers a key early estimate, that given in the 1944 White Paper, A national health service,5 and traces its relationship to the first key post-war estimate, that contained in the Financial Memorandum to the NHS Bill of 1946;6 the third shows how these early estimates functioned as de facto yardsticks in debates on NHS expenditure under both Labour and Conservative governments; the fourth examines some crucial flaws in the two early estimates and seeks to establish that they could not serve as a realistic basis for judging expenditure trends in the post-war Service. The conclusion discusses some of the implications of the use of this problematic yardstick.
Historians and the (Early) Politics of NHS Expenditure In the first two fiscal years of the NHS, expenditure was well in excess of estimates. In 1948/9 NHS gross expenditure for Great Britain exceeded the estimate by 39 per cent; and in 1949/50 it was 27.5 per cent higher than the estimate.7 These cost overruns triggered what Webster has termed "the crisis of expenditure", and the first volume of his official history of the Service charts in detail the conflicts over both the interpretation of NHS spending trends and what response should be made to them under the 1945 to 1951 Labour administrations.8 However, historians have also pointed to restraint on NHS expenditure extending throughout the first decade of the Service.
This emphasis on financial control was manifested in a perceived need closely to monitor expenditure trends. Under Labour this role was assumed by a Cabinet Committee, which first met in April 1950.9 Under the Conservatives it was the responsibility of the Guillebaud Committee set up in 1953.1' Concern with the control of expenditure is, of course, not synonymous with restraint of expenditure. However, Webster's reference to retrenchment during the 1950s is supported by analysis of NHS expenditure trends which set them in a broader historical context. Thus an expenditure series in constant (1985) prices constructed by John Appleby indicates an increase in out-goings in real terms of 20.2 per cent over the period 1950/1 to 1959/60.11 To put these figures in longer-term perspective, they are broadly comparable with those under the Thatcher governments of the 1980s. Thus Appleby's series indicates that, from 1979/80 to 1988/9, real NHS spending in the UK rose by 18 per cent.12 5Ministry of Health/Department of Health for and R Lowe, Welfare policy under the Early Cost Estimates in the National Health Service However, while the historical literature has pointed to both the aim and the achievement of restraint in NHS expenditure from 1950 to 1960, it has also questioned the need for such restraint. In this respect it has echoed the finding of the Guillebaud Committee. The Committee decided to contract out its investigation to the National Institute for Economic and Social Research."3 The work was undertaken by Brian Abel-Smith, then at the National Institute, with Richard Titmuss acting as "consultant",'4 and the resulting monograph was published as The cost of the National Health Service in England and Wales. This research, which was crucial in informing the findings of the Committee, showed a picture of modest expenditure growth and that the NHS was absorbing a falling share of national income during the years 1949/50 to 1953/4.1' Later historical work has pointed to similar conclusions. Thus, for example, Jim Tomlinson has shown how limited were the demands of the NHS on key materials and labour in the early years of the Service.'6 Nevertheless, while the literature has suggested that anxiety over the rate of growth of NHS expenditure in this period was misplaced, it has not addressed how such concerns were created and sustained. In this respect, aside from Webster's reference to the influence of early cost estimates discussed above, there has been no attempt to account for this pervasive concern with expenditure control. To examine the implications of Webster's argument it is necessary to begin by analysing a key expenditure estimate made before the beginning of the NHS, that in the 1944 White Paper and its relation to the estimate given in the Financial Memorandum to the NHS Bill of 1946.
The 1944 White Paper and Financial Memorandum Estimates
In the third section it will be argued that the 1946 Financial Memorandum estimate for NHS expenditure operated as a yardstick for critics of the level of NHS spending under both Labour and Conservative governments in the first decade of the Service. Here I examine this estimate and its relation to the earlier one in the 1944 White Paper, A national health service. It has generally been agreed that a major impetus to wartime planning of a national health service stemmed from the Beveridge Report.17 Beveridge elaborated three "assumptions" which were seen as underpinning the proposals for the reform of social security. One of these, "assumption B", was for "comprehensive health and re-habilitation services for prevention and cure of disease" to be "available to all members of the community".'8
Although this "assumption" provided a stimulus to wartime health planning, the Report contained no detailed proposals on the anticipated structure of a future '3PRO MH 137/26, 'Committee of Enquiry 1945 -1951 ', Twentieth Century Br Hist., 1995 into the Cost of the National Health Service ', GC (2): 194-219, pp. 200, 205-6. 1953 The Financial Memorandum also presented expenditure in "gross" and "net" terms. The former referred to total expected expenditure on the Service whereas the latter deducted contributions to its funding from non-exchequer sources, principally the part of National Insurance Contributions that was allocated to the funding of the NHS. These non-exchequer sources were estimated to contribute £47.5 million, hence the "net" figure of £126.5 million. The overall "gross" and "net" figures for Great Britain are presented in Table 2 . These figures were to be significant as the yardsticks used by critics concerned with trends in NHS expenditure. Early Cost Estimates in the National Health Service double the figure (£126 millions) on the basis of which the Government decided to go forward with the Service in 1946". The reference was, again, to the Financial Memorandum, as the £126 million was the expected "net" expenditure figure for the health services in Great Britain given in that document.32
The Post-Guillebaud Debate The use of early expenditure estimates as yardsticks can also be discerned at the end of the first decade of the Service. Following the Suez crisis, new pressures for cuts in social services and in NHS expenditure operated. However, a distinctive feature of this period was that the Guillebaud Report allowed for arguments which set NHS spending in a broader macro-economic context. Thus, in January 1957, Dennis Vosper, the Minister of Health, sought to temper proposed cuts by pointing out that NHS expenditure was falling as a share of national income.33 However, such an approach was strongly resisted by the Treasury, and in a draft statement for the Chancellor (Lord Thorneycroft) of February 1957 the yardstick of the Financial Memorandum was again used: "we have given anxious consideration to the growing cost of the National Health Service. When it was established it was expected to cost [a total ofl £175m a year. By 1949/50 the cost had risen to £450m
... in 1957/8 the gross cost of the Service will be £690m".34 Here the £175 million refers to a rounding of the Great Britain gross expenditure estimate in the two Financial Memoranda as indicated in Table 2 . Right through the first decade of the Service, therefore, the estimate in the Financial Memorandum to the NHS Bill for England and Wales (itself substantially derived from the 1944 White Paper) was given a quasi-contractual status.35 To use Webster's term, "suspicion" derived from the fact that the health ministers had signally failed to keep to this initial estimate. Naturally, this involved an implicit assumption that the estimate was reasonable, and that the fact that it had been exceeded to such a degree was an indicator of the failure properly to control health expenditure. However, as shown above, Webster characterized early estimates as "speculative" and "low". If this were the case, then 3 The emphasis in this article is on the importance of the earliest official estimates of the cost of a national health service. The estimates for fiscal year 1948-9 were revised upwards from those given in the Financial Memorandum so the 1948/9 estimate for England and Wales was £198.4 million or £264.5 million on an annualized basis. The cost overruns relative to this estimate and that in 1949/50 were, of course, highly significant in the "crisis of expenditure" but, as
the article seeks to demonstrate, the (lower) original estimates served as a pervasive and even more exacting yardstick.
33PRO CAB 129/85, C (57), ' Basingstoke, Macmillan, 1981, p. 42. Secondly, there was a bias to "economy" which engendered resistance to setting public spending in a macro-economic context and to seeing positive benefits for such spending. On the latter see R Lowe, 'The core executive, modernisation and the creation of PESC 1960 -64', Public Administration, 1997 (4): 601-15. Tony Cutler the "problem" lay not so much in the divergence between actual expenditure and the early estimates, but rather in the estimates themselves. If they had seriously miscalculated likely NHS spending they had created a yardstick to which it was impossible to conform. The next section evaluates this standard.
The Flawed Yardstick: The 1944 White Paper Estimate Evaluation of the cost estimate in the 1944 White Paper focuses on three areas: the dental and ophthalmic estimates; the pharmaceutical cost estimates; and the cost estimates for the hospital service. These were selected because of their significance for differences between the service costs estimated in the 1944 White Paper and the expenditure out-turns in the first fiscal year of the Service.
The dental and ophthalmic services are grouped together because public sector provision for adults in these areas came through the National Health Insurance (NHI) system. In the White Paper, dental expenditure was expected to be £10 million per annum and ophthalmic expenditure £1 million per annum.36 As the NHS started in July 1948, figures for the first fiscal year have to be annualized to achieve comparability with the White Paper figures. If this is done, the (annualized) outturn for 1948/9 for the dental service in England and Wales was £29 million, and for the ophthalmic service £19.9 million,37 sums far exceeding the White Paper estimates.
In the case of pharmaceuticals, the 1944 White Paper did not give a separate figure for expected costs under the new service. However, such a breakdown was given in draft versions of the Financial Appendix to the White Paper. These indicate that the annual cost of pharmaceuticals in England and Wales was expected to be £6 million per annum.38 The Hinchcliffe Committee, which investigated the costs of the pharmaceutical service in England and Wales and reported in 1959, did not give a cost figure for the first fiscal year of the Service. However, a Public Record Office (PRO) file gives an estimate of £19.5 million for that part-year or £26 million on an annualized basis,39 and by 1949/50 annual expenditure had increased to £31.7 million.40
Hospitals were expected to be the most expensive part of the future service. The White Paper anticipated that the hospital service in England and Wales would cost £80 million or 61 per cent of total expenditure (see Table 1 ). As previously noted, if an anticipated £7 million from voluntary hospital contributory income is added to this figure, the total financial resources for the hospital service in England and Wales was expected to be £87 million. Committee), London, HMSO, 1959, para. 51. Early Cost Estimates in the National Health Service on the hospital service in 1948/9 was £193 million.4' Hospitals were thus significant for two reasons: there was a substantial difference between the estimate in the White Paper and the out-turn for the first fiscal year of the Service, though it was proportionately smaller than those for the dental/ophthalmic and pharmaceutical services; and hospitals were expected to constitute the most expensive part of service provision.
The Dental and Ophthalmic Estimates To understand the problems posed by the White Paper estimates in the dental and ophthalmic areas, it is necessary to look at some key expenditure estimates in wartime health planning that preceded the White Paper.42 The first major estimate produced by the Ministry of Health during wartime was titled 'Approximate cost of the main health services'. In that document a figure of £30 million is given for the total cost of a dental service under a future service, of which £20 million is the cost to "public funds".43 To set these figures in context, it is necessary to recognize that, at this stage, the dental service was envisaged as providing for the adult population (those over 15 years old) only. Provision for under-1Ss was to be through the School Medical Service and local authority clinics. The source for the figure in the 'Approximate cost' estimate was a document of 21 July 1942 entitled 'Cost of dental treatment'. In the latter, two take-up possibilities for dental services were used: these predicted that 10 or 20 per cent of adults would use the dental service annually." The figure given in the 'Approximate cost' document corresponded to the cost if the 20 per cent take-up rate materialized.45 The cost to public funds was anticipated to be lower than the total cost because, although treatment would be free, provision of dentures would involve a charge.
However, a major reduction occurred in a later important draft estimate entitled 'Finance of new health scheme'.' This gave a cost to public funds figure of £10 million, half the earlier estimate, and this is also the figure cited in the 1944 White Paper.47 The cut is not explained in this estimate, but a likely reason was a tension in dental policy. John Welshman has pointed to a "sea change" in official attitudes to dental provision in wartime planning, which contrasted with those prevailing in Tony Cutler the inter-war period.48 An important element in inter-war thinking was that low levels of take-up in the School Medical Service were a function of parental ignorance or negligence. The "sea change" led to a tendency to see low take-up as rooted in structural problems such as poverty. 49 This shift in approach meant that public policy should be geared to encouraging the use of the dental service; an attitude reflected in the Report of the [InterDepartmental] Committee on Post-War Dental Policy, a committee of civil servants chaired by the Permanent Secretary to the Ministry of Health, Sir John Maude. The Report linked restricted use of the service with the lack of a preventative approach to dental care. However, this preventative ideal was also seen as constrained by the supply of dentists. The Committee argued that 12,000 registered dentists were in practice and that while "this is adequate to present effective demand for dental treatment" it was "inadequate to secure any substantial improvement in the dental condition of the nation".50
The Committee therefore advocated a policy of concentrating resources on "priority" groups: nursing and expectant mothers, schoolchildren and adolescents (15-to 17-year-olds). A general service with a preventative bias was initially to be applied to these groups and, with respect to the rest of the population, the Committee argued that "stimulation of demand by education methods, by the provision of clinics and by the extension to the general population of 'dental benefit' or its equivalent must be timed to keep pace with the actual increase in the supply of dentists".5'
This approach was supported by the relevant ministers, Henry Willink, the Minister of Health, and Thomas Johnston, the Secretary of State for Scotland. In a joint memorandum to the War Cabinet, they argued that "we have little doubt that ... the proper course is to concentrate our efforts on the teeth of the rising generation, and for that purpose to amplify and improve existing services dealing with mothers and pre-school children and to extend that service to adolescents".52 This not only endorsed the priority group policy but was seen as having implications for costs. Thus the shift from a comprehensive service was said to mean that estimates can be "substantially cut for the time being".53
With respect to the ophthalmic estimate, the 'Approximate cost' document cited an estimated total cost of £4 million per annum and a cost to public funds of £2 million. The source of this estimate was a document entitled 'Ophthalmic benefit'.'
The lower cost to public funds reflected the expectation that half of the cost of spectacles was to be paid by the user. However, there was an important difference between the two estimates. As noted, the 'Approximate cost' estimate was premised on a 20 per cent take-up rate, three times the take-up rate under National Health ', 11 Feb. 1943 . unsigned, 21 July 1942 Early Cost Estimates in the National Health Service Insurance (7 per cent). In contrast, the ophthalmic estimates assumed that there would be no increase in take-up but that any increase in cost would flow solely from the higher population coverage. This, under NHI coverage, for ophthalmic benefit was 11.8 million and the cost to public funds was £630,000." The 'Ophthalmic benefit' document assumed a coverage of 46 million or 3.9 times the coverage under NHI. If the NHI cost is grossed up to the new population coverage this would give £2.3 million, or £2 million if rounded down. There was, however, a reduction in the ophthalmic estimate which parallels that for the dental service discussed above. The 'Finance of new health scheme' estimate also reduced the figure by half, giving a cost to public funds of £1 million.56 Again, it is likely that the reason for the cut was the adoption of a restricted service reflecting resource constraints and, in the 1944 Commons debate on the White Paper, Johnston stated, "we propose that there shall be an ophthalmic service as soon as the required increase ofpeople in the profession can be obtained".57 The 1944 White Paper used the £1 million estimate.58
The serious problems with the White Paper dental and ophthalmic estimates relate to two issues. The first was that certain policy premises underlying the estimates were under constant debate and subject to modification; the second was that there were inconsistencies in the approach to the estimates in the two areas.
The policy question relates to two further issues: the question of charges; and that of the scope of an immediate post-war Service. The assumption of a charge for appliances meant that the cost to public funds of the dental and ophthalmic services was expected to be substantially reduced. This assumption stemmed from the Beveridge Report where it was argued: "To ensure careful use, it is reasonable that part of the cost of renewal of dentures should be borne by the person using them ... the same holds true of optical appliances".59 However, a wartime planning document discussing dental policy pointed to the tension between this position and that of divorcing access to the service from ability to pay.' Naturally, such a tension meant that a policy of charging could be abandoned on the grounds that it acted as a deterrent to service use and raised awkward administrative problems of what did or did not constitute "misuse".61 This line of argument suggested that the provision of these services should be free at the point of use. However, there were two major expenditure implications. The first was that the totality of service expenditure would fall on public funds. The second, and arguably more important feature, was that the terms of access to the Service would now be different from those which applied under NHI, since there would be no charge to the user. 
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The second source of policy ambivalence was whether a universal service ought to be provided at the outset of the NHS or whether a more limited service should be offered. A precedent for the former was provided by Beveridge, since his report had envisaged "a comprehensive national health service" which was to include access to "dental, ophthalmic and surgical appliances" (and thus, perhaps by implication, dental and ophthalmic treatment) "for every citizen".62
It was argued above that the most plausible reconstruction of the sharp downward revision of the dental estimates was the "priority group" policy, and that similar restrictions on the ophthalmic service were also anticipated. However, with respect to dental provision, this approach was effectively reversed by the recommendations of the Teviot Committee. Appointed in April 1943, part of its terms of reference was to report on "the progressive stages by which, having regard to the number of practising dentists, provision for an adequate and satisfactory dental service should be made available for the population".63 Such terms implied a "priority group" policy. However, the interim report, published in November 1944, recommended that a dental service be provided for the whole population. This was argued on two grounds: it was seen as integral to a comprehensive medical service,64 and was necessary to stimulate an awareness of the importance of dental health amongst the population.65 The latter concern was in line with the view that dental services were being under-utilized; it was noted earlier that the priority group policy went along with downplaying the stimulation of demand for the non-priority group. However, a reversal would have a clear financial corollary. If a priority group policy was the basis for the White Paper cost estimate figures, then the abandonment of such a policy would make these estimates untenable since a universal, not a restricted, basis of access was now presupposed.
However, if charges and tensions between a restricted and a universal service were crucial to policy shifts that rendered the White Paper assumptions redundant, there were also important issues relating to the Ministry's approach to cost estimates in these two areas.
As previously indicated, the estimation of levels of demand were inconsistent. The dental estimates projected much higher levels than those occurring under NHI. No analysis is given in the dental estimate documents of the effective selection of the 20 per cent rate. However, there could be two reasons for expecting an increase in demand. The first was the policy of seeking to stimulate demand as part of a preventative policy. The other was that there would also be a substantial call for new dentures. Such a backlog could be related to treatment costs in the inter-war period. Thus, for example, Roger King has argued that full dentures cost as much as 10 guineas, and this meant that "many people either did not bother ... or continued to use a set which had become a poor fit".'M Cmd. 6565, 1948 ', Dental Historian, 1994 , no. 26: 11-21, PP 1943 Early Cost Estimates in the National Health Service However, while there were plausible reasons for planning for an increased demand for dental services, in the case of ophthalmic treatment quite different criteria were used. The estimate simply took NHI expenditure levels (and hence, by implication, demand levels) at the end of the inter-war period and extrapolated them to the whole population. Naturally this assumed that NHI take-up levels would remain constant, the increase of cases would merely be a result of the total population coverage. However, there was also reason to expect a backlog effect similar to that in the dental service. For example, there was a parallel to the ill-fitting dentures tolerated because of the cost of the replacement. NHI coverage for ophthalmic benefit was limited to less than 12 million people. Thus most of the market for spectacles was not via the recommendation of ophthalmologists or sight-testing opticians but through "sixpenny service at Woolworth's" or "itinerant vendors or second-hand from market stalls".67 It would, therefore, have been realistic to plan for a substantial increase in demand stemming from the abandonment of inferior spectacles. Naturally, if this were to happen, the assumption of a constant NHI level of service take-up grossed up to a larger population would be highly inaccurate.
The Pharmaceutical Estimates
In contrast to the other two areas considered in this paper, the documentary evidence for the derivation of the pharmaceutical cost estimates is very sparse. Pharmaceutical figures were bracketed under the total cost of the general medical service. While substantial attention was devoted to estimating the expected level of general practitioner pay, pharmaceutical costs received no detailed attention.68 In estimates of February 1942 and May 1943, they were put at £5 million per annum and the figure given in the 1944 White Paper was £6 million per annum.69
The lack of explicit documentation makes it impossible definitely to conclude how these figures were reached, but a plausible basis for them can be suggested. In the case of the ophthalmic estimates, the final figure assumed that expenditure would rise pro rata with population coverage, and it is possible that a similar procedure was used in the case of pharmaceuticals. In 1938, population coverage for NHI any reconstruction has to be tentative, it can be said that the figure falls within the £5-6 million range of the wartime planning estimates.
As noted, this was an area in which very substantial cost overruns occurred. To understand the possible reasons for this it is necessary to look at two major drivers of pharmaceutical costs: the demand for general medical services and the (derived) demand for drugs; and the cost per prescription, which itself reflects the mix of drugs prescribed and the terms under which they were supplied to a national health service. If the working hypothesis is adopted that extrapolation was used to arrive at the estimate, then it is possible to analyse the relative importance of these different cost drivers.
In 1938, 68,256,000 prescriptions were issued in England and Wales under the NHI general medical service,71 and a projection for universal population coverage would give an expected annual figure of 149 million prescriptions. The PRO statistical series on pharmaceutical services shows 141 million prescriptions issued in 1948/9, or roughly 189 million on an annual basis.72 This suggests that demand would have been under-estimated by around 25 per cent. However, given that expenditure for the first two fiscal years of the service was running at around four to five times the 1944 White Paper estimate, prescription costs were clearly the central determinant in the overrun. The use of extrapolation would assume that the average cost per prescription would remain unchanged at the 1938 level of 8d. However, by 1948/9 it was 2s. 9d.73 The increase in average prescription costs were the crucial factor. In turn, this raises the question of how far the very low early estimate in this area reflected weaknesses in financial control or was attributable to factors that were difficult to predict.
In the case of the demand estimate, extrapolation would involve a straightforward problem: that the population covered by NHI was radically different from that to be covered under a national health service, and that there was a particularly striking contrast on gender lines. In 1938, 12.5 million men in England and Wales were covered for NHI, 63 per cent of the male population; the corresponding figures for women were 6.3 million and 29 per cent.74 Here lay the potential for a "backlog" effect in which, particularly, women who had been excluded from general medical provision, free at the point of use, took advantage of the new conditions of access. This might have been anticipated, given the evidence available on long-term health problems amongst working-class women. NHS. This showed that male consultation rates (between the ages of 16 and 64) in 1948 were slightly lower than those under NHI in 1946, with a slight rise in consultation rates for men over 65. In contrast, the 1948 consultation rate for women aged 16 to 64 was just under 10 per cent higher than the 1946 figure; and for women over 65 it was 25 per cent higher.76 Clearly extrapolation meant a failure to pick up this "backlog" effect.
On the issue of average prescription costs, a crucial feature was the pattern of innovation in the drug market. In this respect, the post-war period exhibited a distinctive character when contrasted with the inter-war period. As Webster has pointed out, the post-war years "coincided with an explosion in the production of new, effective and often expensive vaccines and drugs".77 This radical shift had a number of consequences. When the NHI ended in 1947, proprietary preparations accounted for 7 per cent of prescriptions and 24 per cent of ingredient costs. Even then, average prescription costs were nearly three times those at the end of the interwar period. By 1950, proprietary drugs accounted for 18 per cent of prescriptions and 44 per cent of ingredient costs; by 1956, the respective figures had increased to 40 per cent and 66 per cent.78
Little attention was devoted to the pharmaceutical estimates compared with that undertaken on GP pay. This may have reflected assumptions regarding the relative cost of these different parts of the general medical service. Wartime estimates operated on the assumption that the pharmaceutical service would cost around one-fifth of the cost of GP pay;79 by 1956/7 the costs of the pharmaceutical service exceeded expenditure on GP pay.80 Given the dynamic character of post-war pharmaceutical developments, early estimates in this area were likely to be problematic. As in the case of demand, but with more drastic effects, the use of extrapolation ran the risk of exposing the estimate to the major cost overruns. April 1944.81 Robb-Smith's article focused on the estimates for acute hospitals and, while it lacked some crucial details, it highlighted fundamental flaws in the White Paper estimate. Robb-Smith sought to construct a reasonable set of assumptions which would allow a figure for expected general (acute) hospital unit costs (i.e. cost per inpatient week) to be calculated. The White Paper included 210,000 "other municipal beds" in the new Service, and these general hospital beds were to be funded by a grant of £100 per bed per annum.82 However, local authorities were also expected to contribute to the financing of hospital provision through local taxation. The White Paper cited an expenditure figure for such municipal hospitals in 1938 of £14.6 million.83 Total local authority hospital spending in 1938 was stated to be £35.7 million. The White Paper expected this to rise to £41.6 million under the new Service.84 Robb-Smith argued that, if an assumption was made that expenditure on "other hospitals and institutions" was the same proportion of total expenditure as in 1938, then it could be expected to rise to £17 million under the new Service (£14.6 million multiplied by 41.6/35.7).85
Voluntary hospital grants would also be at £100 per bed per annum, and it was anticipated that 100,000 beds would be available under the new Service in this sector. However, to obtain a figure for the total funding of voluntary acute provision under a new service, an additional assumption was required regarding the likely level of voluntary income used to support this provision. Robb-Smith assumed that a further £6 million would come from this source.86 He made no attempt to justify this figure, but it is broadly consistent with the available data. In 1938 total voluntary hospital income in England and Wales was £12.1 million with £4.8 million coming from voluntary gifts and investments, and £7.3 million from payments for services.87 The largest part of the latter (£6.3 million) was accounted for by patient payments and revenue from subscription schemes.88 Robb-Smith cited a unit cost figure of "£3 per week". In fact, as Table 3 indicates, the implied cost per patient week was somewhat higher than this at £3 7s per week. Robb-Smith claimed that such an expected unit cost would be inadequate "unless the majority of beds" under the new service were of "public assistance" institution standard, which he assumed to be radically at variance with the objectives of the White Paper.
To evaluate this argument it is necessary to go back to the concept of service standards set out in the White Paper, and to discuss the implications of such standards for hospital costs. The White Paper begins with the following statement "the Government have announced that they intend to establish a comprehensive health service.... They want to ensure that in future every man, woman and child can rely on getting all the advice and treatment and care which they may need in matters of personal health; that what they get shall be the best medical and other facilities available".89
The White Paper does not directly exemplify the acute hospital provision which could be seen as "the best". However, there are some indications in the text which allow an idea of the kind of institutions which served as a de facto model. Thus in Appendix (A), which discusses "existing health services", stress is laid on the variability of standards of provision. With respect to the voluntary sector, there were "larger and powerful general hospitals of the kind familiar in London and certain of the other big cities with distinguished specialists and consultants available with first-class modern equipment and treatment facilities . . . drawing their patients from areas wide afield-as leading institutions in the medical world".9 In contrast there were also "small 'cottage' hospitals" in the voluntary sector "really functioning as local nursing homes".9' Similar sharp contrasts were discerned in the municipal sector. When discussing general municipal hospitals, the White Paper referred to institutions "at every stage of development from sick wards of an institution for the aged or chronic sick to the most modern and up-to-date hospitals".92
Given such contrasts it might be reasonable to take as exemplars of "the best", the major London teaching hospitals to which the White Paper refers; and, in the municipal sector, the acute hospitals of the London County Council (LCC). The latter are relevant because the LCC had gone furthest in appropriating beds from Robb-Smith sought to calculate the cost of a consultant service based on the assumption of 17 consultants per 100,000 population or a population ratio of 5,900:1 consultant. He also assumed that each consultant would require an assistant.' In his view, consultants should earn £2,000 a year, assistants £1,000.
Robb-Smith's assumptions on consultant ratios were higher than those adopted by a Ministry wartime planning estimate in which George Godber, Principal Regional Medical Officer, drew on hospital survey work in the Sheffield and North Midlands area. He argued that 454 consultants would be required in the area, a population ratio of 8500:1.97 Godber did not discuss the issue of assistants, but if Robb-Smith's assumption of one consultant to one assistant is accepted as well as his expected pay levels, then the two estimates would involve the expenditure levels shown in Table 5 .
Taken together, the various strands of evidence considered so far suggest that there was powerful support for Robb-Smith's claim that expected acute hospital costs were too low, given the health policy objectives of the White Paper. In effect, the White Paper assumed a cost per bed in general hospitals of roughly £3 7s per week. As has been demonstrated (see Table 4 ), the lowest cost per inpatient week in a London teaching hospital, Charing Cross, was 34 per cent higher than this norm and the highest, Guy's, was 84 per cent higher. In the case of the LCC, general hospitals' average costs were 22 per cent higher.
Robb-Smith also attempted to estimate a more realistic figure. He argued that "it is unlikely that the average cost per bed can be less than £3 15/-per week" but this figure was "exclusive of the consultant service". As noted, he thought that Tony Cutler Table 5 Estimates of the cost of a consultant service (England and Wales) £21 million would be an appropriate figure for such a service. At the £3 15s per bed hospital provision was estimated by Robb-Smith to cost £58.5 million and £21 million for the consultant service, a total cost of £79.5 million.98 This contrasted with the £48 million of public funds suggested in the White Paper (or £54 million if the additional £6 million voluntary income was included), an alternative cost of roughly £5 per bed per inpatient week (£80 million divided by 310,000 beds). Interestingly, this was also the figure cited by the local authority representatives in the Ministry wartime estimates: a Memorandum from the three major local authority associations in June 1943 argued that costs per inpatient week in an "up-to-date and well equipped hospital" would not be "less than £5 per week".9 The Memorandum gives no basis for the £5 figure and, as was indicated earlier, Robb-Smith's consultant service costs involved staffing levels higher than those thought appropriate in Godber's estimate. However, it is also worth noting that his initial cost per inpatient week, £3 15s, was itself low, certainly in the context of the London experience. Thus a reasonable case could be made for a £5 norm. In certain respects it might be thought conservative, but even this implied general hospital expenditure substantially higher than that stipulated in the White Paper.
Conclusion At the beginning of this paper two views of the trajectory of NHS expenditure during the first decade of the Service were contrasted. The Guillebaud Committee concluded that it could find no scope for substantial cuts in Service expenditure. This conclusion was related to a trend of modest increases in NHS expenditure in real terms and of Service expenditure falling as a share of national income. of the Service, Webster observed that "the financing of the health service made little allowance for the correction of inherited problems such as maldistribution and general deficiency in standards".'04 Arguably, early estimates of the likely cost of the NHS played a significant role in providing a questionable standard by which parsimony was regularly justified in the first decade of the Service.
'"Webster, op. cit., note 2 above, p. 395.
